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PAYING TO PLAY (SOMEWHERE ELSE): AN EXAMINATION




Although often an afterthought, exit fees are an important as-
pect of college athletics today given the era of “conference realign-
ment” when dozens of colleges and universities are choosing to
leave their athletic conferences for greener pastures elsewhere.
This Article focuses on the conferences that include liquidated
damages clauses in their bylaws and determines whether they are
legally enforceable.  The answer is complicated, especially since dif-
ferent conferences utilize different contract language.  Two ap-
proaches have developed.  The best is to craft these clauses so the
athletic conference withholds a portion of the profits due a breach-
ing member after it announces it plans to leave.  Clauses like these
are consistent with precedent from non-sports contracts.  Public
policy is an alternative reason to argue for enforceability.  Ulti-
mately, a court will have to answer this question.  In the meantime,
schools will continue to pay millions to leave their conferences.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hundreds of University of Missouri students crowded into the
student union on November 6, 2011, to hear confirmation of what
had become the worst kept secret in college sports: their beloved
Tigers were switching from the Big 12 Conference to the Southeast-
ern Conference (SEC).1  The announcement was cause for celebra-
tion as confetti fell from the ceiling and the chancellor described
the event as a momentous, bold, and defining moment in the his-
* B.J., University of Missouri 2006; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law 2013; Senior Associate Editor 2012-2013, Missouri Law Review.  I
would like to thank Professor Thomas A. Lambert for lending his contract law
expertise as guidance while writing this Article.
1. See Vahe Gregorian, MU, SEC Tie The Knot Courtship Ends In Smiles, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 7, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.stltoday.com/
sports/college/mizzou/mizzou-sec-tie-the-knot/article_fd8d2311-0502-5f74-a07d-
5112ce0bbfc6.html (describing press conference where Missouri announced its
conference move). While the official announcement was made on Nov. 6, the
SEC’s website had accidentally announced the move ten days earlier. See id.
(107)
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tory of the school.2  As exciting as the announcement was, it was
essentially a very public and much ballyhooed breach of contract.
And like many breaches of contract, the University would owe dam-
ages.  Negotiations finalized five months later settled those damages
at $12.4 million.3
Missouri is only one of an ever-expanding number of colleges
and universities that are changing conferences and exposing them-
selves to potential liability for breach of contract.4  In fact, four
schools have done it twice since 2010.5  Although liquidated dam-
ages provisions have been included in conference bylaws for years,
no clause appears to have been the subject of a lawsuit that has
reached the merits.6  Instead, parties prefer to settle their disputes
out of court.7  In the past, some schools simply paid the agreed-
upon amount on their way out of the conference.8  But in less than
ten years, payments have increased greatly for athletic departments
seeking to switch athletic conferences.9  Exit fees are clearly an ex-
pensive part of college athletics today, and the hypothetical ques-
2. See id.
3. See Steve Walentik, Big 12 Withholding $12.4 Million From MU as Exit Fees,
COLUMBIA DAILY TRIBUNE (Mo.), Feb. 29, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.co-
lumbiatribune.com/news/2012/feb/28/big-12-withholding-124-million-mu-exit-
fees (reporting on settlement between the University of Missouri and Big 12).
4. See Andrea Adelson, Conference Lineups Keep Changing, ESPN (May 31,
2012), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/7988280/college-football-
landscape-changed-last-year-conference-lineups-adjust.  In fact, 24 schools changed
conference alignment in the scope of a calendar year. See id.
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Big 12 Conference Bylaws §§ 3.1-3.3, available at http://www.big12
sports.com/fls/10410/pdfs/handbook/Bylaws.pdf [hereinafter Big 12 Bylaws]
(last visited Dec. 1, 2012).  For a further discussion of the history of collegiate
athletic conferences, see infra Part II.
7. For a further discussion of instances of settlements regarding conference
realignments, see infra notes 83-84, 103, and accompanying text. R
8. See Gregg L. Katz, Note, Conflicting Fiduciary Duties Within Collegiate Athletic
Conferences: A Prescription for Leniency, 47 B.C. L. REV. 345, 346 (2006) (describing
potential opportunities for revenue-boosting offered by shifting athletic confer-
ences).  In 2003, Virginia Tech, the University of Miami, and Boston College each
paid $1 million to leave the Big East Conference for the Atlantic Coast Confer-
ence. See id.
9. See Mike Casazza, Source: WVU, Big East Reach Conditional Settlement, CHARLES-
TON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 9, 2012, at P1A, available at http://www.dailymail.com/
News/breakingnews/201202090205 (reporting on settlement between West Vir-
ginia University and Big East Conference).  Nine years after the 2003 Big East
payouts, it reportedly cost West Virginia University $20 million to exit that confer-
ence. See id.  In the Big 12 Conference, Missouri and Texas A&M settled with the
Big 12 for $12.4 million each only one year after it cost Colorado and Nebraska
$6.6 and $9.25 million respectively to exit the conference.  See Walentik, supra note
3 (reporting on University of Missouri’s and Texas A&M’s exit fees); see also Su- R
zanne Halliburton, Nebraska and Colorado Pay to Exit Early, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Sept. 22, 2010, at C01, available at http://www.statesman.com/sports/collegefoot-
2
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tion of whether a conference’s liquidated damages provision is
legally enforceable is at the heart of every negotiation.
This article will attempt to answer that hypothetical question,
examining the different bylaws of many of the nation’s top athletic
conferences along the way.  Ultimately, it advises athletic confer-
ences on how to draft an enforceable liquidated damages provision
that will help provide the most protection for its interests when a
college or university decides to leave.
I. THE HISTORY OF COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC CONFERENCES
Athletic conferences have been a part of college athletics for
more than a century, actually predating the establishment of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).10  Historically,
athletic conferences have consisted of universities that share a com-
mon purpose and geography.11  But that role has changed as col-
lege athletics, particularly football, have become more profitable.
Maybe the most important role of athletic conferences today is ne-
gotiating television contracts for their members, something that was
exclusively left for the NCAA just three decades ago.  With this his-
tory in mind, it is no surprise that the president of the NCAA re-
cently described the “conference realignment” phenomena as a
“market shakedown” centered on media rights.12
Colleges and universities started teaming up in the 1890s to
establish the first athletic conferences.13  One of the goals of the
newly created conferences was to give their member schools a “real
ball/nebraska-colorado-reach-exit-deals-with-big-12-930282.html (reporting on Ne-
braska’s and Colorado’s exit fees).
10. See History, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/
ncaa/about+the+ncaa/history (last updated Aug. 13, 2012) (stating that NCAA was
founded in 1906).  For a further discussion on athletic conferences first forming in
the 1890s, see infra note 14 and accompanying text.
11. See Katz, supra note 8, at 348-49 (explaining background of conferences). R
12. See Dennis Dodd, NCAA President: Conference Realignment “A Market Shake-
down,” CBS SPORTS (May 31, 2012, 5:22 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/college
football/blog/dennis-dodd/19217878/ncaa-president-conference-realignment-a-
market-shakedown (stating NCAA president’s views on conference realignments).
13. See Mark Fricke, Nebraska Football In The 1890s, COLL. FOOTBALL HISTORI-
CAL SOC’Y NEWSLETTER, Vol. 19, Issue 1 (2005), available at http://www.la84founda-
tion.org/SportsLibrary/CFHSN/CFHSNv19/CFHSNv19n1d.pdf (describing
origins of intercollegiate athletic conferences).  Seven Southern schools formed
the Southern Intercollegiate Athletic Association three years later. See Roger
Saylor, Southern Intercollegiate Athletic Association, COLL. FOOTBALL HISTORICAL SOC’Y
NEWSLETTER, Feb. Issue 2 (1993), available at http://www.la84foundation.org/
SportsLibrary/CFHSN/CFHSNv06/CFHSNv06n2g.pdf (discussing establishment
of Southern Intercollegiate Athletic Association).  Other universities met in the
1890s to begin forming the predecessor to today’s Big 10 conference. See History of
Conference Realignment, NBC SPORTS, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/37689691/
3
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schedule of opponents.”14  But controversies were common, high-
lighted by the Western Inter-State University Football Association’s
problems with racial tension,15 fights between players,16 and bicker-
ing between schools over money17 and the scores of games.18  Al-
most from their beginning, conferences frequently added and
subtracted teams.  The Missouri Valley Conference, for example,
has counted more than 30 schools as members throughout its more
than 100-year history.19
Athletic conferences took on new importance in 1984 after the
United States Supreme Court held that the NCAA’s monopoly of
television rights of college football violated federal antitrust laws.20
Conferences immediately took the NCAA’s place at the negotiating
table.21  Conference movement has been constant ever since, as
schools try to maximize their profits by moving to the conferences
with the more lucrative television contracts.22  In fact, more than
forty percent of major college football teams changed their confer-
ns/sports-college_football/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2012) (illustrating chronology of
history of conference realignment).
14. See Fricke, supra note 13, at 10 (explaining reasoning behind conference R
development).
15. See id. (describing how Missouri forfeited its 1892 contest against Ne-
braska rather than take field when Nebraska roster included black player). Ne-
braska was awarded a 1-0 forfeit victory and the conference established “rules
against refusing to play scheduled matches.” Id. (noting effect of Missouri
walkout).
16. See David Briggs, Bitter Divide Separated Missouri, Iowa, COLUMBIA DAILY
TRIBUNE (Mo.), Dec. 26, 2010, available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/
news/2010/dec/26/bitter-divide-separated-missouri-iowa (offering examples of
fighting between players).
17. See Football, COLUM. MO. HERALD, Jan. 18, 1895, at 5 (describing how Iowa
and Nebraska threatened to withdraw from conference if not given half of pro-
ceeds from Thanksgiving game between Missouri and Kansas).
18. See Fricke, supra note 13, at 12 (recounting incident when touchdown was R
in dispute during game).
19. See Steve Richardson, CENTURY OF SPORTS: THE MISSOURI VALLEY CONFER-
ENCE, 1907-2007 (2006) (listing members of Missouri Valley Conference during its
history).
20. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 136 (1984) (holding NCAA was violating antitrust laws by exclusively nego-
tiating television deals for member schools).
21. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Ends N.C.A.A. Control of TV Football, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 1984, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/28/us/
high-court-ends-ncaa-control-of-tv-football.html (discussing conference develop-
ment of “contingency plans” in anticipation of Supreme Court’s ruling); see also
United Press International, Ruling on TV Rights Favor 2 Pac-10 Teams, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
11, 1984, at B13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/11/sports/ruling-
on-tv-rights-favors-2-pac-10-teams.html (discussing Pacific-10 Conference and Big
10 Conference entering television deals with CBS).
22. See John Infante, Realignment’s Effect on the NCAA, NCAA (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://www.ncaa.org/blog/2011/09/realignments-effect-on-the-ncaa [hereinafter
4
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ence affiliations during a five-year span in the 1990s.23  That era,
one executive said, changed the role of conferences from “service
organizations to sports properties,” and “commissioners went from
being rules interpreters and championship managers to business
people – essentially CEOs of major sports properties.”24  It all has
led up to today’s college football industry, which attracts millions of
fans and produces billions of dollars in revenue.25
Thirty-one conferences are part of NCAA Division I athletics
today, but not every conference is created equally.  Only eleven
compete in the Football Bowl Subdivision, the highest level of inter-
collegiate college football.26  Six of those – the Atlantic Coast Con-
ference, the Big East Conference, the Big 10 Conference, the Big
12 Conference, the Pacific 12 Conference, and the Southeastern
Conference – are commonly referred to as “power conferences” be-
cause of their position within the Bowl Championship Series, which
determines football’s national champion.27  Very few football pro-
grams are unaffiliated with a conference.28
Infante I] (discussing continued realignment of conferences and effects). Only
one year since 1985 has been quiet of any conference movement. Id.
23. See Malcolm Moran, College Football ‘95; A Season of First Looks, Last Looks
and In-Betweens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, § 8, at 5 (reporting that “By this time
next year, 45 of the 109 major college football teams – 41 percent – will have
changed conference affiliations within a five-year period, according to the College
Football Association”).  That decade also saw the expansion of the S.E.C. and the
establishment of the Big 12 in order to host a conference championship in foot-
ball, creating another premiere match up to produce more television revenue. See
Arkansas Goes to S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1990, at B9, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/1990/08/02/sports/arkansas-goes-to-sec.html (discussing expansion
of S.E.C.); see also Braden Gall, The History of Big 12 Realignment, ATHLON SPORTS,
http://www.athlonsports.com/college-football/college-football-history-big-12-re-
alignment (last visited Sept. 4, 2012) (recounting timeline of events leading to
creation of Big 12).
24. Gary Brown, Brand New Leagues: Conferences Make Their Marks Through New
Branding Campaigns, NCAA (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/con-
nect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2011/August/Brand+new+leagues
(describing culture surrounding football conferences in 1990s).
25. See Katz, supra note 8, at 345 (noting “massive revenue-creating machine R
college football would become”).
26. See John Infante, Consolidation of Powers, NCAA (Jan. 16, 2012), http://
www.ncaa.org/blog/2012/01/consolidation-of-powers [hereinafter Infante II]
(discussing eleven collegiate conferences that comprise Football Bowl
Subdivision).
27. See John Hoover, BCS Commissioners Favor Power Conferences in New Playoff
Format, BLEACHER REPORT (Nov. 14, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
1409139-bcs-commissioners-favor-power-conferences-in-new-playoff-format (listing
six automatic qualifying conferences within current Football Bowl Subdivision).
28. See Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/
ncaa/about+the+ncaa/membership+new (last updated Dec. 7, 2011) (stating that
there are 120 schools that are members of the Football Bowl Subdivision); see also
Andy Katz, BYU Leaving MWC for 2011-12 Season, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.
5
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A school’s decision to leave its athletic conference can cause a
domino effect, as the jilted conference will most likely find replace-
ment members from other leagues, creating more vacancies for
those conferences to try to fill.29  The Big East has been on both
sides of this scenario recently.30  Texas Christian University’s
(“TCU”) recent status epitomizes today’s “conference realignment”
pandemonium.  TCU’s Horned Frogs, a longtime member of the
Mountain West Conference, were set to join the Big East until they
decided instead to join the Big 12 to replace Texas A&M.31
Damages paid when a university leaves a conference have
steadily risen in the past ten years as conferences have amended
their bylaws and the profitability of college athletics continues to
grow.32  These payments no longer only effect the school that de-
cides to move to greener pastures as, for example, the Big 12 re-
portedly agreed to pay a quarter of a $20 million settlement so its
newest member, West Virginia University, could leave the Big
East.33
Although conference movement is nothing new, the move-
ment in the last few years has been ubiquitous, providing constant
drama for even casual college football fans.34  Given that no end of
com/ncaa/news/story?id=5517305 (last updated Sept. 10, 2010, 2:42 PM) (listing
four schools – BYU, Navy, Army, and Notre Dame – that were independent in
football for 2011-2012 season).
29. See Paul Myerberg, Conference Shifting Is Now The Norm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2011, at SP10, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804
EFDD173BF93BA1575BC0A9679D8B63 (discussing domino effect that occurs
when school leaves its athletic conference).
30. See Cheryl Waity & Julian Zeng, History Repeating, Almost, with Big East
Shakeup, THE DEPAULIA, http://www.depauliaonline.com/sports/history-repeat-
ing-almost-with-big-east-shakeup-1.2611454#.UQANbR08CSo (last updated Aug.
27, 2012) (describing how, after Atlantic Coast Conference raided Big East Confer-
ence in 2003 for three schools to boost its membership to twelve teams, Big East
recruited five schools, three of which played football, from Conference USA,
which reciprocated by pilfering six teams from other conferences); see also Kevin
Kelly, TCU and West Virginia Officially Join the Big 12 Conference Today, FB-
SCHEDULES.COM (July 1, 2012) http://www.fbschedules.com/2012/07/tcu-west-vir-
ginia-officially-join-big-12-conference-today/ (describing how Big 12 recruited
Texas Christian University and West Virginia University away from Big East to re-
place Missouri and Texas A&M).
31. See TCU Joins Big 12 for 2012-13, ESPN (Oct. 11, 2011, 11:12 AM), http://
espn.go.com/dallas/ncf/story/_/id/7085749/big-12-vote-unanimous-allow-tcu-
horned-frogs-2012-13 (discussing TCU’s latest conference change).
32. See Casazza, supra note 9 (discussing amount of money that colleges have R
to pay in order to change conferences).
33. See Myerberg, supra note 29, at 10 (discussing payments Big 12 made in R
order to assist West Virginia in changing conferences).
34. See id. (recounting history of conference realignment); see also Infante II,
supra note 26 (discussing history of conference realignment); TCU Joins Big 12,
supra note 31 (discussing history of conference realignment). R
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“conference realignment” is in sight, the enforceability of liqui-
dated damages provisions and negotiation of “exit fees” will con-
tinue to be important for both athletic conferences and
universities.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Although they are commonly referred to as “exit fees,” the
proper legal term for these payouts is liquidated damages.35  In a
liquidated damages clause, the parties agree to the compensation
for a possible breach upon entering into a contract.36
A. The Enforceability of Liquidated Damages Provisions
Courts typically distinguish between liquidated damages provi-
sions that are meant to compensate the non-breaching party and
those meant to penalize the breaching party; the former are legally
enforceable, whereas the latter are not.  However, even though this
view is firmly entrenched as the law regarding liquidated damages,
some critics have questioned its rationale.
1. The Established, Common Law Approach
Courts have developed a two-part test to determine if a liqui-
dated damages provision is enforceable.  First, the stipulated dam-
ages must be reasonable in light of “the anticipated or actual loss
caused by the breach.”37  The reasonableness of the approximation
is judged at the time the parties entered the contract, whereas the
actual damages are judged at the time of the breach.38  Second, the
non-breaching party must have difficulty in proving its loss.39  Gen-
erally, the harder it is to prove the actual loss the easier it is to show
that the amount fixed as liquidated damages is reasonable.40  How-
35. See Gregorian, supra note 1 (discussing “exit fees”); Bradford, infra note R
89. R
36. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 432-33 (9th ed. 2009) (defining liquidated
damages).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981) (discussing first test
to decide whether liquidated damages provision is enforceable).
38. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, Williston on Contracts § 65:1 (4th ed. 2012) (ex-
ploring reasonableness of approximation).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 37 (explaining sec- R
ond part of test used to decide whether liquidated damages provision is
enforceable).
40. Id. (explaining how to prove loss).
7
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ever, if the amount is “unreasonably large,” a court will deem it
“unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.”41
Allowing parties to stipulate in their agreement the amount of
damages recoverable in the event of a breach is part of the “funda-
mental principle of freedom of contract.”42  Liquidated damages
clauses also reduce the expense of litigation by saving time for
“courts, juries, parties, and witnesses.”43
An enforceable liquidated damages provision is meant simply
to compensate the non-breaching party for damages that were too
difficult to anticipate under the circumstances at the time the par-
ties entered into the contract.44  A liquidated damage clause is un-
enforceable if it is meant to punish the breaching party because the
“central objective” of contract remedies is compensatory, not puni-
tive.45  Punishment clauses, in effect, seek to coerce performance by
making a breach too costly.46  However, distinguishing between
clauses that merely induce performance and those that coerce it is
“a subtle distinction” for courts to make.47  Analyzing a liquidated
damages provision requires balancing the interests of the parties, as
the “rules are designed to allow [them] the greatest freedom of
contract while at the same time preventing them from overstepping
that freedom by including illegitimate penal provisions.”48
Even if a liquidated damages provision is deemed unenforce-
able, the injured party is not left without a remedy.49  The remain-
der of the agreement stands, and the non-breaching party may
pursue the conventional damages remedy for breach of contract.50
41. See id. (stating consequences of “unreasonably large” liquidated damages
provision).
42. See WILLISTON, supra note 38 (discussing freedom to contract). R
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 37 (describing how R
liquidated damages provisions can reduce litigation costs).
44. See WILLISTON, supra note 38 (discussing aim of liquidated damages R
provision).
45. See id. (“Punishment of a promisor for having broken his promise has no
justification on either economic or other grounds and a term providing such a
penalty is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”).
46. See id. (describing punishment clauses).
47. See id. (discussing difference between clauses that induce performance
and clauses that coerce performance).
48. Id. (discussing analysis of liquidated damages provisions).
49. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.18 (4th ed. 2004) (noting
other remedies besides liquidated damages provisions).
50. See id. (stating contract with unenforceable penalty provision controls as
though offending clause does not exist).
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2. A Modern and Liberal View of Penalty Provisions
While the liquidated damages and penalty provision dichot-
omy is firmly entrenched as the law, it has received its fair share of
criticism.51  Most notably, some judges on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit have questioned the effectiveness
of not enforcing penalty provisions, especially those included in
contracts between sophisticated parties.52
Judge Posner introduced this criticism in the 1985 case of Lake
River Corporation. v. Carborundum Company, which dealt with the en-
forceability of a damage formula that called for a minimum guaran-
teed amount of product to be shipped and paid for.53  After the
contract period, Carborundum had not fulfilled the guarantee and
refused to pay Lake River the agreed-upon damages.54  Lake River
sued, claiming liquidated damages.55  In dicta, Judge Posner ques-
tioned “whether a modern court should refuse to enforce a penalty
clause where the signator is a substantial corporation, well able to
avoid improvident commitments.”56  Penalty clauses, the judge said,
“provide an earnest of performance” and increase the promisor’s
credibility, which may be essential in some deals.57  On the other
hand, they may discourage efficient breaches of contracts.58  But
sophisticated parties can weigh such risks when entering contracts
that involve agreeing to a penalty clause.59  Therefore, Judge Pos-
ner concluded, “the refusal to enforce penalty clauses is (at best)
paternalistic—and it seems odd that courts should display parental
solicitude for large corporations.”60  But ultimately, the Seventh
51. See, e.g., Larry A. Dimatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law
of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633, 637 (2001) (criticizing current applica-
tion of law as “unwarranted judicial intervention into freedom of contract”).
52. See WILLISTON, supra note 38 (detailing Judge Posner’s criticism of com- R
mon law which determined some economically sound clauses were penalties and
therefore invalid).
53. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1286 (7th Cir.
1985) (noting damage formula required payment in amount of shortage between
received and contracted-for product).
54. Id. (explaining Carborundum’s actions prior to lawsuit).
55. Id. at 1286-87 (noting procedure of case and plaintiff’s argument).
56. See id. at 1288-89 (questioning modern theories on contract law).
57. See id. at 1289 (noting liquidated damage clause may prove essential to
party’s willingness to enter contract).
58. See id. (providing hypothetical in which efficient breach does not occur
because of liquidated damage clause inclusion).
59. See id. (inferring that sophisticated parties consider all present and future
costs inherent to inclusion of liquidated damages clause; therefore, presence of
clause under these circumstances is valid as economically efficient).
60. See id. (questioning modern courts’ paternalistic approach to large
corporations).
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Circuit panel declined to enforce its newly-developed view, given
the Illinois case law on the subject, and it determined that the pro-
vision was an unenforceable penalty clause “because it is designed
always to assure Lake River more than its actual damages.”61
Twelve years later, Judge Posner further articulated the “aca-
demic criticism” in Lawyers Ins. Corporation v. Dearborn Title
Corporation:
A penalty clause has no effect on anyone except the par-
ties, so why should a court refuse to enforce it, unless
there is evidence of fraud or other overreaching not here
argued?  Penalty clauses can serve a valuable signaling de-
vice: by agreeing to a penalty Dearborn manifested a cred-
ible determination to break itself of what had become a
bad habit of paying its debts to United with checks that
bounced. . . .  It can even be argued that a penalty clause is
unlikely to overcompensate the promisee if an ex ante
(before the fact) perspective is employed, because the
promisor would not agree to such a clause unless it was
necessary to compensate the promisee for an expected
loss.  As for any concern that penalty clauses might dis-
courage efficient breaches . . . the promisee can always
waive the penalty and will do so if compensated by the
promisor. . . .  Against all this it can be argued that penalty
clauses, precisely by encouraging the formation of con-
tracts likely to be broken . . . would, if enforceable, throw
more contract cases into the courts.  Such a clause might
also make the promisee . . . stubborn about agreeing to
contract modifications when the promisor gets into
trouble.62
Despite Judge Posner’s analysis, the opinion summarized that
“[t]he law is clear that penalty clauses are unenforceable,” and the
majority of the panel came to the same outcome as it did in Carbo-
rundum.63  More than a decade later, different plaintiffs invited a
Seventh Circuit panel to adopt Judge Posner’s stance, but the court
again declined.64
61. See id. at 1289-90.
62. Lawyers Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1161 (7th Cir.
1997).
63. Id. (explaining holding that penalty clauses are unenforceable).
64. See Checkers Eight Ltd. P’ship v. Hawkins, 241 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir.
2001) (refusing to invalidate Illinois law controlling penalty in contract even where
parties are “commercially experienced”).
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B. Liquidated Damages in Sports Contracts
Although no court has ruled upon the enforceability of a liqui-
dated damages provision in an athletic conference’s bylaws, prece-
dent interpreting these clauses in other sports contracts is
enlightening.
1. Coaches’ Contracts
The seminal case addressing the enforceability of liquidated
damages in a coach’s contract is Vanderbilt University v. DiNardo.65
Vanderbilt University sued its former football coach, Gerry
DiNardo, for breach of contract after he resigned from Vanderbilt
to become the football coach at Louisiana State University.66  Van-
derbilt hired DiNardo in 1990 and the parties executed a five-year
contract that contained a reciprocal liquidated damages provi-
sion.67  The university agreed to pay DiNardo his remaining salary
under the contract if Vanderbilt replaced him.  Conversely,
DiNardo agreed to reimburse the university one year’s pay minus
withholdings if he left Vanderbilt before the end of the contract
and worked elsewhere.68  The district court entered summary judg-
ment for Vanderbilt and DiNardo appealed.69
DiNardo argued that the clause was “an unenforceable penalty
under Tennessee law,” which only allows for liquidated damages to
be collected if the term “is reasonable in relation to the anticipated
damages for breach, measured prospectively at the time the con-
tract was entered into, and not grossly disproportionate to the ac-
tual damages.”70  DiNardo argued that the parties did not
contemplate that Vanderbilt’s damages “would go beyond the cost
of hiring a replacement coach” and “that his salary ha[d] no rela-
tion to [the university’s] damages.”71
65. Vanderbilt University v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 1999); see also
Richard T. Karcher, The Coaching Carousel in Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics: Eco-
nomic Implications and Legal Considerations, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1, 48 (2009) (noting DiNardo as leading case on point).
66. See DiNardo, 174 F.3d at 753 (detailing circumstances of DiNardo’s em-
ployment and resignation from Vanderbilt).
67. See id. at 753-54 (noting agreement by Vanderbilt to pay remaining value
in event of breach by university, and quoting contract language requiring payment
in event of breach by DiNardo in amount of coach’s base salary multiplied by num-
ber of years remaining).
68. See id. at 753-54.
69. See id. at 753 (discussing procedure of case).
70. See id. at 755 (explaining parties’ arguments).
71. Id. at 756.
11
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The majority of the Sixth Circuit panel rejected the coach’s
argument, emphasizing “that Vanderbilt wanted the five-year con-
tract because ‘a long-term commitment’ by DiNardo was ‘important
to the University’s desire for a stable intercollegiate football pro-
gram,’ and that this commitment was of ‘essence’ to the contract.”72
This stability, the court found, helped in recruiting players and re-
taining assistant coaches.73  Finally, the court held that the amount
of compensation was reasonable because Vanderbilt presented evi-
dence of costs it incurred in recruiting a new head football coach,
moving expenses for the new coaching staff, and compensation dif-
ferentials.74  Therefore, the circuit court affirmed the district
court’s ruling that the contract contained an enforceable liquidated
damages provision.75
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Nelson concluded that the pro-
vision was meant to operate as a penalty, pointing to the fact that
the clause only required DiNardo to pay damages if he left Vander-
bilt and was employed by another institution.76  However, the uni-
versity’s damages would presumably be the same regardless of
whether DiNardo “quit to coach for another school.”77  Therefore,
Judge Nelson said that the clause was meant to penalize DiNardo
for taking another job rather than to compensate the university for
any damages it suffered “as a result of being left in the lurch.”78
A similar dispute involved the contract of former Ohio State
basketball coach Jim O’Brien, who led the Buckeyes to the 1999
72. See id.
73. See id. (“Both parties understood that the extension was to provide stabil-
ity to the program, which helped in recruiting players and retaining assistant
coaches.”).
74. See id. at 757 (“The liquidated damages are in line with Vanderbilt’s esti-
mate of its actual damages.  Vanderbilt presented evidence that it incurred ex-
penses associated with recruiting a new head coach of $27,000.00; moving
expenses for the new coaching staff of $86,840; and a compensation difference
between the coaching staffs of $184,311.”).
75. See id. at 760.  Nonetheless, the panel remanded the case back for further
proceedings to determine an unrelated factual issue. Id.
76. See id. at 760 (Nelson, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“My
principal reasons for viewing section eight as a penalty are these: (1) although the
damages flowing from a premature resignation would normally be the same
whether or not Coach DiNardo took a job elsewhere, section eight does not pur-
port to impose liability for liquidated damages unless the coach accepts another
job; (2) the section eight formula incorporates other variables that bear little or no
relation to any reasonable approximation of anticipated damages; and (3) there is
no evidence that the parties were attempting, in section eight, to come up with a
reasonable estimate of the university’s probable loss if the coach left.”).
77. See id. (stating irrelevance of DiNardo’s use of post-resignation time to
University’s damages).
78. See id. (discussing impetus behind section eight clause).
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Final Four, but was fired five years later because of a recruiting vio-
lation.79  O’Brien sued alleging that the university owed him liqui-
dated damages because the firing was not “for cause.”80  Like Coach
DiNardo’s contract, O’Brien’s agreement called for liquidated dam-
ages based upon his salary and the length of time remaining on the
contract when he was fired.81  The Ohio court held that the liqui-
dated damages were not a penalty and awarded the coach more
than $2.25 million, finding that when the parties entered into the
contract extension in 1999, the damages that O’Brien might suffer
for being fired without cause were “uncertain as to amount and dif-
ficult [to prove].”82
More recently, West Virginia University sued its former football
coach, Rich Rodriguez, seeking the enforcement of a $4 million
liquidated damages provision after Rodriguez left to coach at the
University of Michigan.  The parties eventually settled for $1.5
million.83
2. Conference Realignment
Disputes over the amount of damages an athletic department
must pay when switching conferences has also led universities into
court, but no case appears to have been decided on the merits of
the enforceability of a conference’s liquidated damages provision.
For example, Virginia Tech and Virginia Commonwealth University
sued five members of their conference that left to merge with an-
other conference, seeking to enforce a $500,000 withdrawal fee, but
79. See O’Brien v. Ohio State Univ., 859 N.E.2d 607, 610 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2006)
(“The evidence shows that the violation consists of a loan made to the family of a
prospect for humanitarian reasons.  The evidence also demonstrates that such
prospect was ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics at the time that the
loan was made.”).
80. See id. at 610 (“The court previously determined that defendant had com-
mitted a breach of its contract with plaintiff when it dismissed him from his posi-
tion as men’s head basketball coach without sufficient cause to do so.”).
81. See id. at 611 (“If Coach’s employment hereunder is terminated by Ohio
State other than for cause . . . Ohio State shall pay and provide to Coach, as partial
liquidated damages, for a period not to exceed twelve (12) months (i) the full
amount of Coach’s then-current base salary . . . and (ii) such normal employee
benefits as Ohio State then provides generally to its administrative and profes-
sional employees . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
82. See id. at 614-15 (discussing court’s holding for liquidated damages, not
penalty).  Consistent with Ohio law, the court also found that the clause was in-
tended by the parties and was not unconscionable. Id.
83. See Karcher, supra note 65, at 51-52 (discussing settlement amount mark- R
edly less than amount specified in penalty clause).  The University of Michigan also
settled for $2.5 million to cover the $4 million liquidated damages provision. Id. at
52.
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the parties eventually settled out of court.84  Additionally, Boston
College successfully sued the Big East Conference to invalidate an
amended $5 million liquidated damages provision in favor of the
older $1 million clause when it decided to leave the Big East for the
Atlantic Coast Conference.85
III. COMMENT
It is impossible to establish a blanket rule regarding the en-
forceability of athletic conference liquidated damages provisions
because each conference utilizes unique contract language.  How-
ever, most athletic conferences appear to prefer one of two
approaches.86
There are signs pointing to the enforceability of conference
liquidated damages provisions, particularly a jilted conference’s dif-
ficulty in proving its loss.  Also, precedent exists where courts have
recognized the unique qualities of sports contracts that validate liq-
uidated damages.87  Of course, some clauses are better constructed
than others and, therefore, more likely to be blessed as legally en-
forceable.  For example, one conference, in what is not the best
choice of words, expressly uses the word “penalty” in its liquidated
damages provision.88  Public policy is a stronger rationale for the
argument that all liquidated damages provisions should be legally
enforceable since it was the breaching college or university that ei-
ther took part in forming the bylaws or assented to them when it
joined the association.
84. See Katz, supra note 8, at 350 (illustrating how universities engage in litiga- R
tion over conference realignments).
85. See Trustees of Boston Coll. v. Big E. Conference, No. 034818BLS, 2004
WL 1926799 (Mass. Super. Aug. 18, 2004) (“Boston College is entitled to withdraw
from the Big East Conference . . . upon payment of a $1 million withdrawal fee. . .
“).
86. This according to an unscientific survey conducted by the author of ath-
letic conference bylaws; bylaws that are available on the Internet and mentioned in
news accounts.
87. For a discussion of the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses, see
infra notes 100-121 and accompanying text. R
88. See Colonial Athletic Association Constitution, art. 4.06(C) (2011-2012), availa-
ble at http://www.nmnathletics.com/fls/8500/supportfiles/Handbook/Mission_
Constitution.pdf?DB_OEM_ID=8500 (“Any member that elects to withdraw from
the Association will be assessed a financial penalty of $1,000,000 and forfeits its
share of the accrued assets of the Association.  The purpose of such payment re-
quirement is to reflect possible financial damages to the Association and to each of
its remaining member institutions.”).
14
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 15 11-FEB-13 10:25
2013] PAYING TO PLAY (SOMEWHERE ELSE) 121
A. Types of Liquidated Damages Provisions in
Conference Bylaws
For those athletic conferences that include liquidated damages
provisions in their bylaws,  two approaches are commonly used: 1)
accessing a fixed “exit fee” for departing schools or 2) determining
the contract liability based upon the conference payouts due to the
school after it announces its plans to leave the conference.89  No-
tice is an important ingredient in both types of clauses.  The confer-
ences that prefer to include a fixed “exit fee” require an exact
amount of notice, whereas conferences that base liquidated dam-
ages upon the conference payouts sometimes utilize a sliding scale
with departing schools forfeiting more revenue the less notice they
provide.
1. Fixed Exit Fees
A flat exit fee appears to be the preferred method of stipulat-
ing damages for breach of contract in athletic conferences today.
For the most powerful conferences, these fees range from $5 mil-
lion to $50 million.90  Even in a less prestigious league like the Sun
Belt Conference, exit fees can cost a departing school up to
$500,000.91  Notice is an important factor for every conference that
utilizes an exit fee, ranging from the Sun Belt’s requirement of one
year to the Big East’s 27-month notice provision.92
89. See Compliance, SEC SPORTS, http://www.secdigitalnetwork.com/SEC-
SPORTS/THESEC/Compliance.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2012) (discussing South-
eastern Conference Rules including lack of liquidated damages provision); see also
Farnsworth, supra note 49, § 12.18 (stating no matter their difference in form, R
“exit fees” are also considered liquidated damages and courts could review them
because “the form of the provision should not obscure the underlying issue of
whether what is provided is in substance a penalty for nonperformance.”); see also
Steve Bradford, Athletic Conference Exit Fees and the Law of Liquidated Damages, BUSI-
NESS LAW PROF BLOG (Sept. 26, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/busi-
ness_law/2011/09/athletic-conference-exit-fees-and-the-law-of-liquidated-
damages.html (“It’s important to keep in mind that these exit fees are, in essence,
liquidated damages.”).
90. Compare Complaint at 12-14, The Big E. Conference v. West Virginia
Univ., (Case No. PB11-6391), available at http://news.providencejournal.com/
breaking-news/2011/11/04/bigeast_v_wvu_110411.pdf (discussing withdrawal
provisions of Big East Bylaws in appendix to complaint), with Harvey, infra note
138 (reporting on ACC’s increase of its exit fee from $20 million to $50 million). R
91. See Graham Watson, UNO Withdraws Sun Belt Membership, ESPN (Jan. 20,
2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=4842825 (discussing Sun
Belt Conference’s decision to waive $500,000 withdrawal fee in light of University
of New Orleans’s unique circumstances after Hurricane Katrina).
92. Compare id., with Complaint at 12-14, The Big E. Conference, (Case No. PB11-
6391), supra note 90. R
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2. Withholding Conference Payouts
Other conferences calculate liquidated damages based on the
amount of conference payouts due a breaching member.  These
clauses take on two different forms: a static calculation withholding
an agreed-upon percentage of profits or a sliding scale withholding
more funds depending on the amount of notice a breaching school
provides.
a. Static Calculations
The Western Athletic Conference’s (“WAC”) liquidated dam-
ages provision allows a member institution to leave the conference
if it provides ten months of notice, but the withdrawing school for-
feits all of its year-end revenue.93  The Mountain West Conference
(“MWC”) follows a similar calculation, but requires 12 months of
notice.94  The Big 12 also utilizes this approach in one of its two
liquidated damages provisions, requiring two years of notice and
the school to withdraw at the end of the current membership
term.95  Additionally, the Big 12 spreads out the loss for the school,
taking half of a school’s payouts for two years instead of an entire
year’s worth of payouts.96
b. Sliding Scale
In its second liquidated damages provision, triggered when a
school gives less than two years notice, the Big 12 utilizes a sliding
scale to calculate liquidated damages.  Under the conference’s by-
laws, failure to provide two years notice costs the school between 70
and 100 percent of the final payouts given to a school.97  A breach-
93. See Western Athletic Conference Code Book 2009-10, art. 2, § 3, W. ATHLETIC
CONFERENCE, http://www.wacsports.com/fls/10100/docs/pdfs/2009-10%20Code.
pdf?DB_OEM_ID=10100 (last visited Sept. 4, 2012) (outlining proper procedure
for withdrawing from league).
94. See Handbook Appendix A: Bylaws of Mountain West Conference, § 1.04(b), CBS
SPORTS, available at http://graphics.fansonly.com/schools/mwc/graphics/pdfs/
handbook/1213-appA.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2012) (detailing notice require-
ments for resigning members).
95. See Big 12 Bylaws, supra note 6, §§ 3.1-3.2 (explaining withdrawal sanctions R
in Big 12).
96. See id. (providing “each Member agrees that the amount of revenue that
would have been otherwise distributable to a Withdrawing Member pursuant to
Section 2 herein for the final two (2) years of the Current Term or the then-cur-
rent Additional Term, as the case may be, shall be reduced by fifty percent (50%),
with the remainder to be distributed to the other Members who are not Withdraw-
ing Members or Breaching Members.”).
97. See id. § 3.3 (outlining penalties for teams withdrawing from league with-
out giving proper notice).
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ing school forfeits more revenue the less notice it provides.98  The
Missouri Valley Conference utilizes a similar liquidated damages
scheme, but allows for a member school to receive its entire share
of conference revenue if it provides the conference with two years
of notice before its departure.99
B. The Enforceability of the Liquidated Damages Clauses
Most courts would analyze the enforceability of an athletic con-
ference’s liquidated damages provision under the two-part Restate-
ment test.  A conference could easily show the difficulty in proving
its loss, but it would have a harder time proving that the liquidated
damages are a reasonable approximation of anticipated loss.
1. Reasonable Approximation of Anticipated Losses
The terms of a conference’s liquidated damages provision de-
termine whether that provision provides a reasonable approxima-
tion of anticipated loss.  A static damages calculation based upon
conference payouts is a more reasonable approximation of antici-
pated loss than fixed monetary values and sliding scales, which may
be unenforceable penalties.
The legal background involving liquidated damages in coach-
ing contracts and other dealings is particularly enlightening.  On
the one hand, in DiNardo and O’Brien, Vanderbilt and Ohio State’s
liquidated damages clauses were based on the coaches’ salaries and
were both upheld.100  On the other hand, the Carborundum case in-
volved a minimum-quantity guarantee, similar to a fixed “exit fee,”
98. See id. (explaining that failure of member to provide proper notice causes
“financial hardship to the remaining Members of the Conference” and so greater
breaches result in greater liquidated damages).
99. See Constitution of the Missouri Valley Conference, § 3.5.3.1, MO. VALLEY CON-
FERENCE, http://www.mvc.org/manual/constitution.pdf (last visited Sept. 24,
2012) (stating “[w]ith 24 or more months’ notice of intent to resign from the
membership, the departing institution receives 100% of its designated share of
distributable revenues, per Conference formula.”).
100. See Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 755 (6th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that liquidated damages clause was not penalty because it was “reasonable in
relation to the anticipated damages for breach . . . .”); see also O’Brien v. Ohio State
Univ., 859 N.E.2d 607, 614-15 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2006) (holding that liquidated dam-
ages was not penalty after considering several factors and recognizing that liqui-
dated damages provision is not penalty “if the damages would be (1) uncertain as
to amount and difficult of proof, and if (2) the contract as a whole is not so mani-
festly unconscionable, unreasonable, and disproportionate in amount as to justify
the conclusion that it does not express the true intention of the parties, and if (3)
the contract is consistent with the conclusion that it was the intention of the par-
ties that damages in the amount stated should follow the breach thereof.”).
17
Meyer: Paying to Play (Somewhere Else): An Examination of the Enforceabi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 18 11-FEB-13 10:25
124 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 107
and was struck down as legally unenforceable.101  In the Rich Rodri-
guez dispute, which involved a fixed monetary amount of damages,
the parties settled for less than half the contracted-upon figure, sug-
gesting that even the parties themselves may have been skeptical
that a court would bless the clause as enforceable.102
In DiNardo, the Sixth Circuit determined that the liquidated
damages provision was reasonable because it was in line with Van-
derbilt’s estimate of actual damages, including expenses of recruit-
ing a new coach, moving expenses for the new coaching staff, and a
compensation difference between the coaching staffs.103  The ex-
penses caused by a breaching conference member are similar.  Los-
ing a member reduces the number of conference games or
matches, creating fewer revenue-producing opportunities (e.g., tel-
evision contracts, sponsorships, and advertising deals).  And like in
O’Brien, a conference’s damages include “collateral income” that it
earns from the member institution’s affiliation with the conference,
particularly in relation to the postseason success of a conference’s
member institutions.104  But replacing a breaching member does
not completely mitigate the damages.  The conference’s remaining
schools may incur higher traveling expenses for years to come, du-
plicated several times a year for the plethora of teams a school
sponsors.105  Also, recruiting a new school may cost the conference
101. See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1292 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding that penalty provision was legally unenforceable because, “it [was]
apparent from the face of the contract that the damages provided for by the ‘liqui-
dated damages’ clause [were] grossly disproportionate to any probable loss and
penalize some breaches much more heavily than others regardless of relative
cost.”).
102. For a discussion of this dispute, see supra note 83 and accompanying R
text.
103. See DiNardo, supra note 100, at 755 (holding that liquidated damages R
clause was not penalty because it was “reasonable in relation to the anticipated
damages for breach” after being “measured prospectively at the time the contract
was entered into” and after finding that damages provision was “not grossly dispro-
portionate to the actual damages”).
104. See O’Brien, 859 N.E.2d at 611-12 (explaining importance of conference’s
“collateral income” in determining damages); see also Blair Kerkhoff, Missouri Loss
Shortchanges Big 12, KANSAS CITY STAR (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.kansascity.com/
2012/03/16/3496127/mizzou-loss-short-changes-big.html (describing payouts to
athletic conferences for NCAA basketball tournament wins by its members
schools); see also Chris Smith, Moving To The SEC Will Pay Off For Missouri, Texas
A&M, FORBES (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/
02/29/why-moving-to-the-sec-will-pay-off-for-missouri-texas-am (explaining how
conferences receive money from conference members’ football bowl
appearances).
105. See Dosh, infra note 129 (reporting that University of Nebraska spent $1 R
million more on travel after it moved from Big 12 to Big 10); see also DISTANCE
BETWEEN CITIES, http://www.distance-cities.com/search?from=Morgantown%2C+
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money to help that school leave its current conference, evidenced
by the Big 12 ultimately agreeing to pay part of West Virginia’s exit
fee so that it could replace Missouri.106  That payment is $5 million
in tangible damages that the conference could have presented dur-
ing a potential lawsuit.  This shows that a jilted conference is stuck
between the proverbial rock and a hard place: either operate a
smaller conference that would produce less revenue or recruit a
new member that would cost money to attract to the conference
and maintain as a member of the conference.
It is reasonable for the liquidated damages to be tied to the
conference payouts.  Like any partnership, each conference mem-
ber profits from the overall success of the conference.  And given
the rapid increased profitability of college sports, it is wise to state
the damages as a percentage of conference payouts instead of a
lump sum.  The damages adequately grow as the conference be-
comes more successful.  Likewise, if the conference were to become
less profitable, then the liquidated damages decrease accordingly.
Lump sum payments, on the other hand, are problematic be-
cause they may be arbitrarily decided and may require a more de-
tailed proof to convince a court that they are not an unenforceable
penalty.107  Also, the fact a conference recently voted to increase its
exit fee could be used to argue against lump sum payments.108
However, the conference would respond that such an increase re-
sponded to the increased profitability of the conference.109  This
may be difficult to prove if the amendment of the bylaws did not
follow a renegotiated television contract, or other event that in-
creased the conference’s profitability.110
Sliding scales are even more problematic.  Judge Nelson, the
dissenting vote in DiNardo,111 would likely object to a sliding scale
WV&to=Columbia%2C+MO (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (calculating that Morgan-
town, West Virginia, is approximately 660 miles east of Columbia, Missouri).
106. For a discussion of the importance of a conference’s “collateral income”
in determining damages, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. R
107. See Bradford, supra note 89 (discussing pitfalls of lump sum payments). R
108. See id. (explaining how court might view fact that conference recently
increased its exit fee); see also Harvey, infra note 138 (reporting on a university R
official who labeled the ACC’s recent increase in exit fee as “punitive”).
109. See Bradford, supra note 89 (suggesting how conferences might respond R
to court’s concerns about exit fees).
110. See id. (“Presumably, the original fee was a reasonable attempt to approx-
imate damages. If nothing has changed to increase the likely damages, is the in-
crease just a penalty?”).
111. See Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 1999) (reversing
District Court’s summary judgment in favor of enforcing damages clause on foot-
ball coach who breached contract).
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because the conference’s damages would presumably be the same
no matter how much notice a college or university provides.112
Granted, earlier notice allows a conference more time to find a re-
placement member, but this does not relate to damages because a
stipulated damages clause alleviates the non-breaching party’s com-
mon law duty to mitigate damages.113  If the notice provision is not
evidence of a penalty provision, a sliding scale’s particularity seems
arbitrary at best.  In the case of the Big 12, does a university that
gives just under two years notice really produce 30 percent more
damage to the conference than a member that gives two years no-
tice?  How can this be reconciled with the Missouri Valley Confer-
ence bylaws, which tacitly admit that a member institution that gives
two years of notice creates no damages at all?114  These rhetorical
questions highlight how a court could read these provisions as pe-
nalizing a member institution for leaving a conference in a hurry.
2. Difficulty in Proving Losses
A jilted athletic conference would have a much easier time as-
serting that its damages are difficult to prove when a member insti-
tution breaches the bylaws and moves to another conference, thus
satisfying the second prong of the Restatement’s enforceability test.
A conference’s damages are not easily quantifiable in monetary
amounts because each university adds unique qualities to the
conference.
A loss of stability is a conference’s biggest damage when a uni-
versity leaves.  In Vanderbilt University v. DiNardo, the Sixth Circuit
recognized stability as an important interest in college sports.115  In
the DiNardo case, the court recognized that stability was important
for Vanderbilt to recruit future players and retain current assistant
coaches.116  For an athletic conference, stability helps recruit future
member institutions and retain existing ones.  No major athletic
112. See id. at 761 (stating that reasonableness of liquidated damages provi-
sion is determined at time agreement is entered into by parties).
113. See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1291 (7th Cir.
1985) (reasoning that “mitigation of damages” is a doctrine of the law of court-
assessed damages, while the point of a liquidated-damages clause is to substitute
party assessment).
114. See Constitution of the Missouri Valley Conference, supra note 99, at 6 (noting R
when member of conference wishes to resign, Missouri Valley Conference requires
24 months notice).
115. See DiNardo, 174 F.3d at 756 (noting DiNardo’s contract language ex-
plained significance of fulfilling contract terms to satisfy Vanderbilt’s desire for “a
stable intercollegiate football program.”).
116. See id. (explaining Vanderbilt’s football program’s stability was “essence”
of DiNardo’s contract).
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conference has suffered a loss of stability more than the Big 12,
which lost a third of its founding members in the course of two
years, thereby jeopardizing its very existence.117  Moreover, two of
those founding members – the University of Missouri and the Uni-
versity of Nebraska – had been affiliated with the Big 12’s predeces-
sors for more than 100 years.118
An athletic conference suffers other “intangible damage” to its
reputation, prestige, and athletic competition when a member insti-
tution exits.119  These damages are difficult to measure, especially
when the conference replaces the departing member.  Should dam-
ages be calculated differently if the conference does not replace the
breaching member?  If not, is a court supposed to judge the two
universities—the former member and the new member—and their
sports programs, side-by-side to determine which is a better mem-
ber?  If so, what factors should a court consider when making that
comparison?  Should academic prestige factor into the calcula-
tions?  What is the value of historical rivalries, several of which have
been upset by a recent “[c]onference [r]ealignment?”120  And what
is the value of a conference’s loss of stability?  How much of the
instability, however much there is, can be attributed to the breach-
ing school, rather than other schools that may have left the confer-
ence beforehand or athletic departments that flirted with the idea
of leaving but decided to stay?  What expert witness would a confer-
ence call to testify about these damages?  This extreme difficulty in
proving its loss has been recognized as potentially offsetting any de-
ficiencies in the proof that the damages are reasonable estimates.121
117. See Dave Matter, Missouri Looks to Leave Big 12, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIBUNE
(Mo.) (Oct. 5, 2011, 1:17 PM),  http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2011/
oct/04/missouri-will-explore-conference-options/ (noting Big 12 teams that de-
parted include University of Missouri, University of Colorado, Texas A&M Univer-
sity and University of Nebraska).
118. See Richardson, supra note 19, at 2 (discussing Nebraska and Missouri R
were both founding members of Missouri Valley Conference in 1907); id. at 6-8
(discussing how Missouri, Nebraska and four other schools broke off from the Mis-
souri Valley Conference to create Big Six conference, which eventually became
part of the Big 12); see also Joe Walljasper, What Becomes of a Bitter Rivalry When the
Games End?, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIBUNE (Mo.) (May 13, 2012), http://www.columbia
tribune.com/news/2012/may/13/what-becomes-of-a-bitter-rivalry-when-the-
games/ (noting that for more than 100 years, Missouri and Kansas were always
members of same conference).
119. See DiNardo, 174 F.3d at 757 (discussing difficulties proving damages
should breach of coaching contract occur).
120. See Walljasper, supra note 118 (noting end of rivalry between University R
of Kansas and University of Missouri when Missouri left the Big 12 Conference for
the Southeastern Conference).
121. For a discussion of this issue, see supra note 38 and accompanying text. R
See also Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
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C. The Enforceability of the Clauses as Penalty Provisions
Even if an athletic conference’s liquidated damages clause is a
penalty provision, the situation is a perfect example of why certain
penalty provisions should be legally enforceable.  Universities and
conferences are both sophisticated parties.  Neither needs “pater-
nalistic” protection from the courts.122  Furthermore, any judicial
protection would only encourage the “deception” and “double
dealing” that allows athletic departments to  “one day . . . agree to
play . . . for one group, only to repudiate that agreement the follow-
ing day or whenever a better offer comes along.”123  Courts should
not be in a hurry to encourage this type of “contract jumping.”124
Conferences in today’s college athletic environment are yearning
for stability more than ever, and they should be able to contract for
that stability with their members.
Universities and colleges assent to a conference’s liquidated
damages provision, either as a founding member or when they join
a pre-existing conference.  A court should not bail out an institu-
tion that agreed to a penalty provision.125  Enforcing the provisions
does not affect anyone except the parties to the contract.126  Moreo-
ver, the parties, not the courts, are in the best position to judge
what is a “reasonable” approximation of likely damages upon a
breach ex ante.127  Simply put, the liquidated damages provisions
may be the best way to preserve a conference’s “idiosyncratic value”
of a university’s membership in the conference.128
The normal concerns for not enforcing penalty provisions are
also not present during today’s “conference realignment.”  Dozens
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and A Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 560 (1977) (“If the conditions inducing damage
agreements are viewed on a continuum, the application of the penalty rule be-
comes clearer: as the uncertainty facing the contracting parties increases, so does
their latitude in stipulating post-breach damages.”).
122. See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir.
1985) (highlighting disapproval of modern courts’ paternalistic approach to large
corporations)
123. See Ne. Univ. v. Brown, No. 20040827F, 2004 WL 616225, at *1 (Mass.
Super. Mar. 11, 2004) (quoting Detroit Football Co. v. Robinson, 186 F. Supp. 933,
934 (E.D. La. 1960)).
124. See id. (discussing problems with conference jumping).
125. See Lake River, 769 F.2d at 1289 (noting liquidated damage clause may
prove essential to party’s willingness to enter contract, but stressing that court
should not paternalistically protect large entities).
126. See id. (emphasizing freedom to contract and subsequent responsibilities
arising from such freedom).
127. See id.
128. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 121, at 574 (explaining relationship be- R
tween penalty clauses and willingness to enter into contracts).
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of universities have been eager to efficiently breach their contracts
despite not knowing whether the relevant clause in their athletic
bylaws was enforceable.129  If leaving was not an efficient breach,
athletic departments like those at the University of Missouri would
decide to stay in their existing conferences.  Even if the clauses
were enforceable penalty provisions, Missouri and the Big 12 would
have been free to settle their disputes for all of the same reasons
that any party to a lawsuit can settle out of court.  The only change
would have been a likely increase in the settlement price.
D. The Best Approach for Athletic Conferences
Of course, a liquidated damages clause is not the only way for
an athletic conference to protect its interest.  Pursuing conven-
tional breach of contract damages is always an option by not includ-
ing a liquidated damages clause in the conference bylaws.130
Conferences may also seek an injunction, which is expressly men-
tioned in the Big East bylaws, to prevent a member institution from
leaving the conference.131
When crafting a liquidated damages provision in its bylaws, a
conference is likely primarily concerned with maximizing its exit
payment from a breaching member.  There are two ways to accom-
plish this goal: suing under a liquidated damages provision or set-
tling out of court.  Negotiation saves time and money, but the likely
enforceability of such a clause can create valuable leverage for an
athletic conference.  On the other hand, enforcing a liquidated
damages provision necessarily requires filing suit against a former
business partner, which would definitely sour the relationship and
may deter other schools from joining the conference in the future.
With these concerns in mind, it is safe to say that an ideal liquidated
damages clause would be legally enforceable and would maximize
the exit fee that a breaching member must pay.  That way, the con-
129. The University of Missouri expects the initial $12.4 million withholding
to create a budget deficit for the University that may last seven years. See Joe
Walljasper, MU Official Says Big 12 Exit Fee is Reasonable, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIBUNE
(Mo.), Mar. 1, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/
2012/feb/29/mu-athletic-official-discusses-big-12-exit-fees/.  After seven years the
university will likely reap benefits from the more lucrative SEC contracts. See
Smith, supra note 104; see also Kristi Dosh, How Much Does A&M Stand To Gain From R
SEC Move?, THE BUS. OF COLL. SPORTS (Sept. 25, 2011), http://businessofcollege
sports.com/2011/09/25/how-much-does-am-stand-to-gain-from-sec-move.
130. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 49 (listing alternative remedies available). R
131. See Complaint at 13, The Big E. Conference, (Case No. PB11-6391), supra
note 90, (noting that other means exist to protect conferences besides liquidated R
damages).
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ference could either sue the institution seeking collection of those
liquidated damages or use the clause to maximize its position dur-
ing negotiations, if it decides to settle out of court.
Athletic conferences seeking to craft a legally enforceable
clause while increasing leverage should mimic the Western Athletic
Conference’s approach, which boils down to a simple quid pro quo: a
school can leave the conference if it provides a reasonable amount
of notice, but should not expect to share any of the conference
profits after it provides such notice.132  This provision is strikingly
similar to the one that the Sixth Circuit upheld in the DiNardo case
and avoids using a fixed monetary amount or a sliding scale that
would be more difficult to prove as a reasonable approximation of
anticipated loss.133
An athletic conference primarily concerned with increasing its
bargaining position may disagree with this position, preferring in-
stead to take the ACC and Big East approaches of establishing, and
then occasionally increasing, a fixed amount of liquidated dam-
ages.134  Supporters of this approach, primarily concerned with
maximizing their bargaining positions, would think the legal en-
forceability of these amended clauses would be irrelevant since they
would never intend for the liquidated damages provision to be
hauled into court.  The Big East’s recent success in settling with
West Virginia for an unprecedented $20 million – more money
than the Big 12 negotiated with four teams that withdrew from that
conference in the past two years – may support a fixed exit fee ap-
proach over a withholding of a certain percentage of conference
payouts.135  But the Big 12’s use of a sliding scale, which applied to
132. For a further discussion of the Western Athletic Conference’s approach,
see supra note 93 and accompanying text. R
133. See Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1999)
(“[U]sing the number of years left on the contract multiplied by the salary per year
was a reasonable way to calculate damages considering the difficulty of ascertain-
ing damages with certainty.”).
134. See Paul Doyle, Big East Raises Exit Fee, Won’t Say Which Teams Are Targeted
To Join, HARTFORD COURANT (Oct. 18, 2011), http://articles.courant.com/2011-10-
18/sports/hc-big-east-expansion-1018-20111017_1_john-marinatto-exit-fee-foot-
ball-only-member (reporting on Big East raising exit to try to prevent schools from
leaving and increase stability); see also Mark Giannotto, Notre Dame is Set to Join ACC,
WASH. POST, at D06, Sept. 13, 2012, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
sports/notre-dame-to-join-acc-in-all-sports-but-football-hockey/2012/09/12/1dcb
9ee2-fce2-11e1-b153-218509a954e1_story.html.
135. See Casazza, supra note 9 (describing fixed exit fee approach); Hallibur- R
ton, supra note 9 (referencing monetary amount of Nebraska and Colorado’s exit R
fees); Walentik, supra note 3 (referencing monetary amounts penalized against R
Missouri University and Texas A&M for withdrawing from Big 12 conference).
24
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-1\VLS104.txt unknown Seq: 25 11-FEB-13 10:25
2013] PAYING TO PLAY (SOMEWHERE ELSE) 131
all four departing schools, has its drawbacks pointing toward classi-
fication as a penalty and includes a part that is nonsensical.136
Drafting a clause without considering its potential enforceabil-
ity is shortsighted for at least two reasons.  First, negotiation and
legal enforceability are not mutually exclusive.  Litigation is always a
backup option to negotiation and athletic conferences should draft
their bylaws to give them as many options as possible.  A school that
breaches a contract with one of these athletic conferences could
point toward the increasing amount as proof of its arbitrariness,
suggesting it is a penalty provision and driving down the confer-
ence’s leverage.137  In fact, a leader at one ACC school thought that
recently increasing the exit fee from $20 million to $50 million was
“punitive.”138  Second, the figure agreed upon could fail to keep
pace with the growing profitability of college athletics, which is
what appeared to happen to the Big East in 2003.139  If a confer-
ence signs a new television contract but cannot amend its bylaws
before a member institution breaches its contract, the conference
may not receive as much liquidated damages as if the liquidated
damages was calculated based on year-end distributions of revenue
that automatically account for increased profitability.  During rising
instability, some member institutions may be hesitant to increase
the exit fee because they contemplate a future move, blocking the
proposed amendment from receiving the required majority of
votes, which is often more than a simple majority.140  For all of
these reasons, drafting a liquidated damages provision that calcu-
136. For a discussion of the Big 12’s use of the sliding scale, see supra notes
111-114 and accompanying text. See also Clay Travis, Big 12 Bylaws on Leaving Are R
Complicated, Weak, OUTKICK THE COVERAGE (Aug. 30, 2011), http://out-
kickthecoverage.com/big-12-bylaws-on-leaving-.php (highlighting confusing lan-
guage in conference bylaws).
137. See Bradford, supra note 89 (asserting damage provisions in conference R
bylaws can be construed as unenforceable penalty provisions if dollar amount is
too high).
138. See Coley Harvey, Florida State One of Two Schools to Vote Against ACC Exit
Fee, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Sept. 12, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/
2012-09-12/sports/os-florida-state-acc-exit-fee-vote-20120912_1_exit-fee-new-fsu-
fsu-athletics-director (reporting Florida State board of trustees chairman believed
exit fee increase was “punitive”).
139. See Katz, supra note 8 (noting booming profitability of Big East teams R
prior to 2003).
140. See, e.g., Colonial Athletic Association Constitution, supra note 88, art. 6.05 R
(requiring two-thirds majority to amend conference constitution).  For instance,
the ACC, which is adding members instead of losing them, was recently two votes
shy of not having the required amount to increase its exit fee. See Giannotto, supra
note 134 (reporting that ten of twelve ACC schools voted for increase in exit fee R
when bylaws required nine).
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lates these damages based upon conference profits is the most pru-
dent course of action.
IV. CONCLUSION
Different clauses included in athletic conference bylaws would
have different difficulties if a court is called to scrutinize them as
liquidated damages provisions.  Damage clauses that call for ath-
letic conferences to withhold profit shares from breaching mem-
bers are the most likely to be legally enforceable because they
represent more reasonable approximation of anticipated loss.  Even
if the provisions are partially or entirely punitive in nature, there is
a compelling argument that a court should still enforce them as a
matter of public policy.  But no court has adopted this novel view.
Of course, an athletic conference’s primary concern may not be
creating an enforceable clause, rather including a clause that pro-
vides it the most leverage in upcoming negotiations.
The only way to get a clear answer is for an athletic conference
or a college or university to subject a clause to judicial scrutiny
through a lawsuit.  Until then, athletic conferences should borrow
from precedent interpreting similar clauses in other contracts, both
in and out of sports.  The precedent suggests that liquidated dam-
ages calculated based on the profitability of the athletic confer-
ences would be more likely to be enforceable than lump sum
payments.  Doing so would maximize the conference’s interest no
matter if they decide to try to enforce the clause in court or negoti-
ate a payment outside of it.  For colleges and universities looking to
switch conferences and breach their conference bylaws, they should
expect to pay millions of dollars.  The price to play somewhere else
may continue to skyrocket.
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